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Photonic integrated circuits have facilitated a drastic increase in the complexity of quantum
information processing, from which near-term quantum networks can benefit. Here, we report
monolithically fabricated indium phosphide transmitters capable of performing measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution. We demonstrate an estimated 1 kbps key rate at 100 km,
with predicted distances over 350 km possible. The scheme removes detector vulnerabilities through
a centralised and untrusted resource, enabling quantum-secured communication with cost-effective,
mass-manufacturable devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum technologies promise a paradigm shift com-
pared to their classical counterparts that will undermine
our current methods of secure communication [1]. It will
soon become necessary to deploy key exchange systems
that are immune to such increases in computing power.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one such approach
which exploits quantum phenomena to exchange secret
keys between distant parties without relying on assumed
computationally hard problems [2, 3]. However, the
stringent requirements for precise control has predom-
inately limited QKD systems to small networks and
laboratories. To realise ubiquitous quantum devices,
new platforms are required for robust operation in harsh
environments.
Integrated photonics has seen vast improvements in
recent years and represents a promising platform for
mass-adoption of quantum technologies [4]. In partic-
ular, indium phosphide (InP) offers crucial benefits for
communication in a robust, phase-stable and compact
platform. Lasers can be monolithically integrated with
mW powers and narrow linewidths, fast electro-optic
phase modulation can reach bandwidths of 40 GHz and
low-loss waveguides allow efficient routing [5]. Such
components mean that it is well suited for quantum
communication protocols [6].
Quantum key distribution has been a leading quan-
tum technology since its advent [2, 3] and has seen
many proof-of-principle demonstrations, networks and
commercial systems [7–11]. However, the security of
these systems is still under question due to information
leakage that is not considered in security proofs. Such
side-channels may allow an eavesdropper to gain sensitive
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information during a key exchange [12] or an attacker
to manipulate a system and determine the secret key
through classical means [13].
To counter these attacks from a malicious adversary,
device-independent QKD schemes have been developed
to remove unnecessary assumptions [14]. One such
vulnerability is with single-photon detectors, for which
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion (MDI-QKD) has been proposed. This approach
removes all possible attacks against the detection sys-
tem [15].
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate the InP
integrated photonic platform as a candidate for quantum-
secured communication. Using MDI-QKD, we show that
1 kbps of secret key can be exchanged at 100 km and
predict positive key rates at more than 350 km. The
system removes detector vulnerabilities and represents
a viable solution for near-term metropolitan quantum
networks.
II. PROTOCOL
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution [15] removes all potential side channels on the
detection system which could be exploited by a malicious
adversary. A schematic of the protocol is shown in
figure 1. Unlike traditional point-to-point protocols,
Alice and Bob act symmetrically by sending BB84 states
to a third party, Charlie. Upon receipt of the states,
Charlie measures the states in the Bell basis and publicly
announces all successful events. The outcomes indi-
cate quantum correlations between states but, without
encoding knowledge known only by Alice and Bob,
reveal no information about the secret key. This allows
Charlie to be completely untrusted and it could even be
assumed that an eavesdropper is operating the receiver
without compromising the security. By sharing the basis
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FIG. 1. Integrated MDI-QKD: a Schematic of the 6× 2 mm2 InP chips used to generate the time bin encoded BB84 weak
coherent states through cascaded MZIs. Timing information is encoded with T. Enc, decoy intensities varied with I. Mod and
phase encoded with Ph. Enc. A 1 GHz photodiode (PD) can be used for power monitoring and feedback. b Microscope images
of the on-chip DBR laser (top) and an MZI (bottom) measuring only 1 mm in length. c Bell state projections for |ψ+〉 (purple)
and |ψ−〉 (red) in time bin encoding. tij corresponds to a detection event in the ith detector, where j is either an early (e)
or late (l) time bin. d MDI-QKD schematic. Two identical devices generate BB84 states independently and send them to
the receiver. The states are projected in the Bell basis using a beam splitter and single-photon detectors (SPDs). A banked
detection system is used to increase count rate, coincidence probability and key rate.
information for each state, Alice and Bob are able to
infer a secret key which can be used in a symmetric key
algorithm.
As we use a weak-coherent source we need to estimate
the number of single-photon events. We employ a four-
intensity decoy state analysis [16] to bound the single-
photon errors and yields. In this protocol, the Z basis
is used to generate key while the X basis bounds the
knowledge of an eavesdropper.
While MDI-QKD typically offers a lower key rate
at short distances when compared with point-to-point
systems [6], it can generate key rate at greater distances
[7]. It also allows equipment sharing through optical
switching without introducing an untrusted node.
III. TRANSMITTERS
Indium phosphide allows monolithic integration of all
the required optical components for quantum technology
in a single platform [5, 6]. Entirely on-chip components
were used to generate high-fidelity, phase randomised,
250 MHz clocked BB84 weak coherent states as required
for quantum key distribution. A schematic of the chip
is shown in figure 1a which measures only 6 × 2 mm2
and demonstrates the density and complexity of optical
components available.
On-chip tunable distributed Bragg reflectors (DBRs)
form an optical cavity around a waveguide integrated
semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA) to create a Fabry-
Pe´rot laser with 50 dB sideband suppression and a 30 pm
linewidth. The linewidth measurement was limited by
the optical spectrum analyser resolution (30 pm) and is
expected to be smaller. The laser has a broad tuning ca-
pability of 10 nm within the telecomms C-band through
current injection of the DBRs. Alternatively, current
injection of the SOA allowed fine tuning in steps of 80 fm.
Crucially, no wavelength filtering beyond the on-chip cav-
ity was required ensuring full compatibility with modern
wavelength division multiplexing while maintaining high-
fidelity wavelength overlap between independent devices.
Phase randomisation was achieved through gain
switching of the SOA, as required by decoy state analysis
[16]. By exploiting the short upper-state and cavity
lifetimes of the integrated laser, 200 ps 1.5 V negative
electrical pulses drained the cavity to generate 250 MHz
clocked, phase randomised windows. Once the laser had
relaxed into continuous operation quantum states can be
encoded in phase coherent time bins.
Electro-optic phase modulation (EOPM) was achieved
through a quantum-confined Stark effect (QCSE) which
has a bandwidth of > 10 GHz. The efficacy of the QCSE
means that the required voltages are lower when com-
pared with other technologies, such as lithium niobate,
and can be as small as 0.5 mm in length. Together with
multimode interferometers (MMIs), we create Mach-
Zehnder interferometers (MZIs) that demonstrate 30 dB
extinction. 120 ps electrical pulses are used to encode
timing information in 2 GHz clocked bins, resulting in
130 ps FWHM pulses when detector jitter is considered.
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FIG. 2. BB84 States: Histogram of the weak coherent states
generated on-chip as measured by single-photon detectors.
The time bins are separated by 500 ps and exhibit a 30 dB
extinction ratio and 130 ps FWHM.
State intensity was modulated through the absorption
of the QCSE to generate varying photon numbers for
decoy state analysis. Square electrical signals allowed an
intensity swing of 20 dB to generate signal and decoy
states. Only this stage of the state preparation required
a multi-level electrical signal. However, the signals were
still limited to only three levels. A vacuum state was
encoded by not pulsing the time encoding MZI.
Finally, to encode |−〉, a pi phase is required between
the two time bins. To avoid phase dependent losses
associated with the QCSE, phase between time bins was
encoded using a further MZI. By applying a phase shift
to the top EOPM in the MZI in the first time bin, and
the bottom EOPM in the second, a pi phase is applied
between the two pulses without decreasing the intensity
of the state. A histogram of the four BB84 states is shown
in figure 2 which demonstrates the 30 dB extinction ratio
and 130 ps FWHM.
Electrical signals were generated by synchronised pulse
pattern generators, arbitrary waveform generators and
FPGAs. All signals are kept below 4 Vpp which
demonstrates a reduced power consumption of the de-
vices. Moreover, an effort has been made to reduce the
number of multi-level signals required as generating two
level states is less demanding than completely arbitrary
waveforms. Such considerations will be crucial for wide
adoption of quantum-secured communication.
IV. DETECTION
Alice and Bob’s states were projected in the Bell basis
using a 50:50 fibre beam splitter and coincidences be-
tween single-photon detectors indicated successful mea-
surements. In a time bin encoding, coincidences between
early and late bins differentiates between |ψ±〉, as shown
in figure 1c. While is it only possible to project onto two
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FIG. 3. Wavelength Overlap: By varying the relative
wavelength between the two lasers, the X basis error oscillates
as the two time bins tune in and out of phase. We demonstrate
fine control to achieve 30% error, limited to a theoretical
minimum of 25%. Z basis errors are independent of the
interference and remain below 1%.
of the four Bell states with linear optics [17], only a single
Bell state is required for MDI-QKD [15].
The Bell state projections require Hong-Ou-Mandel
(HOM) interference [18, 19] at the beam splitter between
states sent by Alice and Bob. Therefore, the two
independent transmitters need to send states that are
indistinguishable in time of arrival, polarisation, photon
number and wavelength to ensure maximal interference.
The relative timing of the transmitters was controlled
by tunable electronic delays with 1 ps resolution and
an optical, classical channel was used to synchronise
the transmitter clocks with the time tagging electronics.
Polarising beam splitters and polarisation controllers
ensured the states sent by the transmitters were both
linearly polarised and had a good overlap at the beam
splitter. Photon number for each transmitter was
calibrated independently and remained stable for the
duration of the experiment.
The lasers were independently controlled and employed
no feedback between the two devices during a key
exchange to remain stable over several hours. Each
transmitter wavelength was coarsely overlapped using an
optical spectrum analyser. The lasers were then finely
tuned in steps of 80 fm through current injection of the
SOA. Interference between the two devices was used to
precisely overlap the wavelengths, as shown in figure 3.
As the two lasers become more indistinguishable, we find
a sinusoidal fringe as the time bins tune in and out of
phase. We demonstrate an error in the X basis of 30%,
which is limited to a theoretical minimum of 25% due
to the reduction in HOM interference from multiphoton
terms [20]. In future systems, this interference could be
used to provide active feedback between the transmitters.
The Z basis errors are not dependent on the interference
and remained around 0.5% during the sweep.
In a time bin encoding scheme only two detectors
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FIG. 4. Key rate: Plot of the asymptotic key rates esti-
mated from the system over an emulated fibre link assuming
0.2 dB/km. We measure a secret key rate of 12 kbps at 25 km,
while at 100 km, 1 kbps of key can be securely exchanged. A
model of the system using experimental parameters estimates
that positive key rates are possible at more than 350 km.
are required and |ψ±〉 can be distinguished through
coincident clicks between time bins. However, while in
principle |ψ+〉 can be distinguished, due to the detector
deadtime (typically more than 50 ns) this event will
never occur, reducing the number of successful events
and key rate. While detectors exist with sub-nanosecond
deadtime, these will typically sacrifice detection efficiency
or wavelength tunability [21, 22].
In this work, we introduce a banked detector system,
which allows an increase in the number of detection
events by allowing |ψ+〉 to be detected with some prob-
ability. This also means we can increase the number of
detection events before detector saturation allowing high
key rates to be generated even at shorter distances. With
waveguide integrated detectors being developed [23], we
envisage systems with many detectors and integrated
switches facilitating a completely integrated quantum key
exchange.
The detectors used were superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors with an operating efficiency of
80%, dead time of 100 ns, timing jitter of 30 ps and dark
count rates of 100 Hz. Events were time tagged to give
absolute timing of events from which coincidences and
successful projections were determined. Bell states were
then matched to corresponding states offline to determine
errors and gains for key rate analysis.
V. RESULTS
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution has been demonstrated between two independent
InP devices. Secret key rates were estimated over an
emulated fibre link (assuming 0.2 dB/km) and are shown
in figure 4. At metropolitan distances, key rates of
more than 12 kbps are estimated in an asymptotic limit
with positive key rates shown out to 200 km. By
characterising the experimental performance, we predict
that a quantum-secured key exchange is possible at
distances of more than 350 km.
We show that interference between independent trans-
mitters is possible for 500 ps separated (2 GHz clocked)
time bin encoded states with state of the art quantum
bit error rates. We find an error of 30% in the X
basis, which is limited to a theoretical minimum of 25%,
demonstrating a good indistinguishability in all degrees
of freedom. In the Z basis, we achieve a quantum bit
error rate of 0.5%.
The mean photon number was 0.2 in the Z basis
for the signal states. In the X basis the mean photon
numbers were 0.1 and 0.01 for decoy state analysis. The
vacuum state intensities are kept at 5×10−4. Low photon
numbers were used to limit the saturation of the detectors
at low channel losses and allow positive key generation
at further distances. The transmitters are clocked at
2 GHz with a state being sent every 8 clock cycles giving a
250 MHz system clock. The bases were biased to produce
an equal number of Z and X states, and therefore each
of the X decoy states were sent one third as often as a Z
signal state.
VI. DISCUSSION
In summary, we have demonstrated indium phosphide
as a potential future platform for quantum-secured com-
munication. Using entirely monolithically integrated
components, we generate phase randomised, time bin
encoded, weak coherent states compatible with quantum
communication protocols. Over a emulated fibre link,
we show 1 kbps of estimated secret key at 100 km,
positive key rates as far as 200 km and estimate the
system would provide positive key rates at distances of
more than 350 km. Quantum bit error rates below 0.5%
are demonstrated along with high-fidelity interference
between independent devices at system clock rates of
250 MHz, comparable to previous demonstrations [7–9].
Integrated photonics offers benefits for future networks
with reduced power, weight and size requirements while
simultaneously facilitating increased complexity with
inherent phase stability. Indium phosphide devices are
shown as a feasible platform for QKD networks, allowing
relatively cost-effective devices to be easily mass man-
ufactured. Integrated laser sources and efficient phase
modulation satisfy all the requirements of high-fidelity
quantum state preparation in a single monolithically
fabricated platform.
The topology of MDI-QKD means that citywide re-
source sharing can be achieved through commercially
available optical switches at an untrusted centralised
location. Furthermore, banks of detectors can be used
to increase secret key rates. Advances in cryogenic cool-
ing mean superconducting detectors are becoming more
5readily available and will likely be a vital part of future
quantum-compatible networks. Such nodes will form the
basis for more complex communication protocols that
will require quantum repeaters and photonic information
processing [24].
The simplicity of the receiver in MDI-QKD lends itself
towards an integrated platform. Waveguide integrated
single-photon detectors [25], on-chip wavelength demul-
tiplexing [26] and cryogenic optical switching [27] mean
that a completely integrated receiver device could further
decrease the cost of QKD systems. Fully integrated
measurement devices could further increase the number
of detectors to allow more counts before saturation
and relaxing the need for sub-nanosecond deadtimes.
Key rates can be further increased through wavelength
division multiplexing and can also allow coexistence with
classical signals [28]. Specialised electronics could be
used to truly take advantage of the size, weight and power
requirements of an integrated system [29].
It is becoming increasingly vital that the future of
secure communication is addressed to counter advances
in classical and quantum computing. While quantum
key distribution has been demonstrated as a potential
candidate in future networks it has yet to be widely
adopted. Mass-manufacturability and robust opera-
tion mean that integrated systems are poised to create
an accessible platform for widespread quantum-secured
communication.
FUNDING
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC) (EP/L015730/1, EP/M013472/1,
EP/L024020/1, EP/N015126/1); European Research
Council (ERC) (ERC- 2014-STG 640079)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank Oclaro for the fabrication of devices
through a PARADIGM project and A. B. Price and
G. D. Marshall for useful discussions.
[1] P. W. Shor, Algorithms for quantum computation: Dis-
crete logarithms and factoring, in Proceedings of the
35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, SFCS ’94 (IEEE Computer Society, Washington,
DC, USA, 1994) pp. 124–134.
[2] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Quantum cryptography:
Public key distribution and coin tossing, in Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Computers,
Systems, and Signal Processing (IEEE, New York, 1985)
pp. 175–179.
[3] A. K. Ekert, Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s
theorem, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] M. G. Thompson, A. Politi, J. C. Matthews, and J. L.
O’Brien, Integrated waveguide circuits for optical quan-
tum computing, IET circuits, devices & systems 5, 94
(2011).
[5] M. Smit, X. Leijtens, H. Ambrosius, E. Bente, J. van der
Tol, B. Smalbrugge, T. de Vries, E.-J. Geluk, J. Bolk,
R. van Veldhoven, L. Augustin, P. Thijs, D. DAgostino,
H. Rabbani, K. Lawniczuk, S. Stopinski, S. Tahvili,
A. Corradi, E. Kleijn, D. Dzibrou, M. Felicetti, E. Bit-
incka, V. Moskalenko, J. Zhao, R. Santos, G. Gilardi,
W. Yao, K. Williams, P. Stabile, P. Kuindersma, J. Pello,
S. Bhat, Y. Jiao, D. Heiss, G. Roelkens, M. Wale,
P. Firth, F. Soares, N. Grote, M. Schell, H. Debregeas,
M. Achouche, J.-L. Gentner, A. Bakker, T. Korthorst,
D. Gallagher, A. Dabbs, A. Melloni, F. Morichetti,
D. Melati, A. Wonfor, R. Penty, R. Broeke, B. Musk,
and D. Robbins, An introduction to InP-based generic
integration technology, Semiconductor Science and Tech-
nology 29, 083001 (2014).
[6] P. Sibson, C. Erven, M. Godfrey, S. Miki, T. Yamashita,
M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, H. Terai, M. G. Tanner, C. M.
Natarajan, R. H. Hadfield, J. L. OBrien, and M. G.
Thompson, Chip-based quantum key distribution, Na-
ture Communications 8, 13984 (2017).
[7] H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, Z.-W. Yu, H. Liu, L.-X. You, Y.-
H. Zhou, S.-J. Chen, Y. Mao, M.-Q. Huang, W.-J. Zhang,
H. Chen, M. J. Li, D. Nolan, F. Zhou, X. Jiang, Z. Wang,
Q. Zhang, X.-B. Wang, and J.-W. Pan, Measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution over a 404
km optical fiber, Phys. Rev. Lett. 117, 190501 (2016).
[8] A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez,
and W. Tittel, Real-world two-photon interference and
proof-of-principle quantum key distribution immune to
detector attacks, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130501 (2013).
[9] L. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fro¨hlich, J. Dynes,
A. Sharpe, S.-B. Tam, Z. Yuan, R. Penty, and A. Shields,
Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabili-
ties using optically seeded lasers, Nature Photonics 10,
312 (2016).
[10] Q. Zhang, F. Xu, Y.-A. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, and J.-W.
Pan, Large scale quantum key distribution: challenges
and solutions, Optics express 26, 24260 (2018).
[11] Some examples of commercial entities developing QKD
systems are ID Quantique, KETS Quantum Security,
MagiQ Technologies, QuintessenceLabs and Toshiba.
[12] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, Secure quantum key
distribution, Nature Photonics 8, 595 (2014).
[13] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Hacking commercial quantum
cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination,
Nature Photonics 4, 686 (2010).
[14] L. Masanes, S. Pironio, and A. Ac´ın, Secure device-
independent quantum key distribution with causally in-
dependent measurement devices, Nature communications
2, 238 (2011).
[15] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.
108, 130503 (2012).
6[16] Y.-H. Zhou, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Making the
decoy-state measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution practically useful, Phys. Rev. A 93,
042324 (2016).
[17] J. Calsamiglia and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Maximum efficiency
of a linear-optical bell-state analyzer, Applied Physics B
72, 67 (2001).
[18] C. K. Hong, Z. Y. Ou, and L. Mandel, Measurement
of subpicosecond time intervals between two photons by
interference, Phys. Rev. Lett. 59, 2044 (1987).
[19] H. Semenenko, P. Sibson, M. G. Thompson, and C. Er-
ven, Interference between independent photonic inte-
grated devices for quantum key distribution, Opt. Lett.
44, 275 (2019).
[20] J. G. Rarity, P. R. Tapster, and R. Loudon, Non-classical
interference between independent sources, Journal of
Optics B: Quantum and Semiclassical Optics 7, S171
(2005).
[21] A. Vetter, S. Ferrari, P. Rath, R. Alaee, O. Kahl,
V. Kovalyuk, S. Diewald, G. N. Goltsman, A. Korneev,
C. Rockstuhl, and W. H. P. Pernice, Cavity-enhanced
and ultrafast superconducting single-photon detectors,
Nano letters 16, 7085 (2016).
[22] Y. Yun, A. Vetter, R. Stegmueller, S. Ferrari,
W. H. Pernice, C. Rockstuhl, and C. Lee, Supercon-
ducting nanowire single-photon spectrometer exploit-
ing cascaded photonic crystal cavities, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1908.01681 (2019).
[23] O. Kahl, S. Ferrari, V. Kovalyuk, G. N. Goltsman,
A. Korneev, and W. H. Pernice, Waveguide integrated
superconducting single-photon detectors with high inter-
nal quantum efficiency at telecom wavelengths, Scientific
reports 5, 10941 (2015).
[24] S. Wehner, D. Elkouss, and R. Hanson, Quantum in-
ternet: A vision for the road ahead, Science 362,
10.1126/science.aam9288 (2018).
[25] J. P. Sprengers, A. Gaggero, D. Sahin, S. Jahanmirinejad,
G. Frucci, F. Mattioli, R. Leoni, J. Beetz, M. Ler-
mer, M. Kamp, S. Hfling, R. Sanjines, and A. Fiore,
Waveguide superconducting single-photon detectors for
integrated quantum photonic circuits, Applied Physics
Letters 99, 181110 (2011).
[26] A. Sugita, A. Kaneko, K. Okamoto, M. Itoh, A. Hi-
meno, and Y. Ohmori, Very low insertion loss arrayed-
waveguide grating with vertically tapered waveguides,
IEEE Photonics Technology Letters 12, 1180 (2000).
[27] F. Eltes, G. E. Villarreal-Garcia, D. Caimi, H. Siegwart,
A. A. Gentile, A. Hart, P. Stark, G. D. Marshall, M. G.
Thompson, J. Barreto, J. Fompeyrine, and S. Abel, An
integrated cryogenic optical modulator, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1904.10902 (2019).
[28] A. B. Price, P. Sibson, C. Erven, J. G. Rarity, and M. G.
Thompson, High-speed quantum key distribution with
wavelength-division multiplexing on integrated photonic
devices, in Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics
(Optical Society of America, 2018) p. JTh2A.24.
[29] R. Valivarthi, Q. Zhou, C. John, F. Marsili, V. B. Verma,
M. D. Shaw, S. W. Nam, D. Oblak, and W. Tittel, A
cost-effective measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution system for quantum networks, Quantum
Science and Technology 2, 04LT01 (2017).
